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Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional
Tragedy from a Lost World
Victoria Nourse*
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III. THE LOST HISTORY OF RIGHT AND EQUALITY: BUCK’S
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDY
IV. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
Some constitutional tragedies are well known: Plessy v. Ferguson1 and
Korematsu v. United States2 are taught to every first-year law student. Buck
v. Bell3 is not. Decided in 1927 by the Taft Court, the case is known for its
shocking remedy—sterilization—and Justice Holmes’s dramatic rhetoric:
“Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”4 A mere five paragraphs long,
Buck v. Bell could represent the highest ratio of injustice per word ever
signed on to by eight Supreme Court Justices, progressive and conservative
alike.
Buck v. Bell is not a tragedy as some others might define tragedy: it is
not a well-known opinion, nor did it yield wide popular criticism; it sits as a
quiet evil, a tragedy of indifference to the Constitution and its most basic
principles. To include Buck as a tragic opinion is to recognize what Hannah

* Burrus-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. This article is part of
Pepperdine Law Review’s April 1, 2011 Supreme Mistakes symposium, exploring the most maligned
decisions in Supreme Court history. Thanks to the members of the Pepperdine Law Review and to
Professor Larson for inviting me to an outstanding symposium. Special thanks to Professors Amar
and White for their insights on the question of constitutional tragedy. I have profited from the work
of many others in my pursuit of the story of eugenics, including my great mentor in this effort,
Professor Dan Kevles, as well as the extraordinary work of Professor Edward Larson and Professor
Paul Lombardo. None, however, are responsible for my historical conclusions. All errors are, of
course, my own.
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
3. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
4. Id. at 207.
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Arendt once dubbed the “banality of evil.”5 Even if grounded in eugenic
assumptions widely held at the time, Buck v. Bell was an utterly lawless
decision—and I mean that quite literally. Holmes treated Carrie Buck’s
constitutional claims with contempt. The opinion cites no constitutional text
or principle emanating from the text. The only “law” in the opinion must be
unearthed from a lost constitutional history embedded in a factual exegesis
full of disdain for the Constitution and humanity itself. Few human
tragedies can be greater “than the denial of an opportunity to strive or even
to hope, by a limit imposed from without, but falsely identified as lying
within.”6 A lawless legitimation of such a principle—one of natural
aristocracy—flies in the face of the very constitutional principles on which
our nation was founded.
II. A CATALYTIC TRAGEDY: BUCK REVIVES STERILIZATION LAWS
Buck v. Bell was not an inevitable social tragedy; it was a catalytic
tragedy. Buck could have been decided differently. Yes, the eugenics it
relied upon was in some quarters banal, although by 1927 its intellectual
heyday had well passed. Sterilization legislation was largely a “dead letter”
by 1927 according to its proponents, interred by a variety of state court
rulings and common-sense administrative fears. 7 By the time Buck reached
the Supreme Court, a majority of state courts that had considered the matter
held sterilization laws unconstitutional on federal and state grounds.8

5. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(Penguin Books 1977) (1963). In this sense I do not disagree with Professor Larson’s argument that
Buck was based on the eugenic assumptions of a different day. As Professors White and Amar so
eloquently explained in their remarks at the symposium, mere error cannot operate to define a
constitutional tragedy. I agree. But I do not believe that all tragedies are immediately recognized as
tragedies or that they later become notorious. Some tragedies may be banal reflections of a once
misguided public opinion, but a constitutional tragedy is one that ignores the Constitution, and its
very reason for existing: to control the powers of government. In its quiet and indifferent
lawlessness, and in its disdain for the written Constitution and its most basic principles, Buck should
count as a constitutional tragedy.
6. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 60–61 (1981 ed.).
7. VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR
TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 24 (2008).
8. Id. at 184–85 n.32 (“Prior to 1922, only one of seven challenges upheld a sterilization
law . . . .”) (citing cases decided from 1913 to 1921 in New Jersey, Iowa, Michigan, New York,
Nevada, Indiana, Washington, and Oregon). See Smith v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Feeble-Minded, 88 A.
963 (N.J. 1913); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev’d, Berry v. Davis, 242 U.S. 468
(1917); Haynes v. Lapeer, 166 N.W. 938 (Mich. 1918); Osborn v. Thomson, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup.
Ct. 1918), aff’d sub nom, Osborn v. Thomson, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (App. Div. 1918); Mickle v.
Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918); Williams v. Smith, 131 N.E. 2 (Ind. 1921); see also Cline v.
State Bd. of Eugenics, Marion Cnty., No. 15,442 (Or. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1921), reprinted in HARRY
HAMILTON LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 287–88 (1922) (“[T]he
1917 [law] is unconstitutional because it clearly violates the provisions of the state and federal
constitution prohibiting class legislation . . . .”). But see State v. Feilen, 126 P. 75 (Wash. 1912)
(upholding a sterilization law).

102

[Vol. 39: 101, 2011]

Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

To constitute a tragedy and not mere error, it must be that the
constitutional decision could have been different. Long before 1927, lower
courts, however uncertain about the precise basis for their views, were
nevertheless bold in their rejection of eugenic sterilization. One federal
court called it “mental torture,” a degradation and humiliation little different
from castration.9 It was a “brand of infamy,” like the branding of cheeks or
cutting of ears.10 As the New Jersey Supreme Court warned: “The feebleminded . . . are not the only persons in the community whose elimination as
undesirable citizens would, or might in the judgment of the Legislature, be a
distinct benefit to society.”11 It was “beyond the comprehension of this
court,” said another judge.12 Such “strange methods of repression”13 belong
to “the Dark Ages.”14
The United States Supreme Court could have followed these lower
courts; it could have invoked a growing consensus among the best experts
about the futility of such laws.15 At the very least, the libertarians on the
Court might have invoked notions of individual liberty extolled in decisions
such as Meyer v. Nebraska16 or Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary.17 But the Court did not. Instead, it upheld
Virginia’s sterilization law, and with Justice Holmes’s decision, eugenics
was legislatively reborn, making America (not Germany) the eugenic
legislative capital of the world in the period from 1927 until 1934.18 After
Buck, state supreme courts pivoted abruptly, affirming the State’s power to
sterilize.19 As the Utah Supreme Court put it in 1929: “[T]he rule announced
9. Davis, 216 F. at 416–17.
10. Mickle, 262 F. at 690–91.
11. Smith, 88 A. at 966.
12. Osborn, 169 N.Y.S. at 645.
13. Mickle, 262 F. at 691.
14. Davis, 216 F. at 416.
15. Holmes’s harsh rhetoric bears the mark of the early 1920s eugenic popularizers, like
Madison Grant, who inveighed against the “unfit” in the grossest of terms. See infra text
accompanying notes 34–39. The science of eugenics, by 1927, was on the decline, even though
popularizing organizations would continue to extol its virtues for another decade and more. See
generally DANIEL KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN
HEREDITY (1995 ed.).
16. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
17. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
18. See NOURSE, supra note 7, at 31 (“Two years after Buck was decided, twelve states had
passed new sterilization legislation; within four years, twenty-two states had introduced new
sterilization bills in their legislatures. In 1932, Jacob Landman, a student of eugenic legislation,
would explain that ‘Buck v. Bell has now . . . committed the United States to a policy of human
sterilization for good or for bad as a means of coping with the socially undesirable in our midst.’”).
19. See id. at 186 n.44 (“The cases arising after Buck deferred to Justice Holmes’s
opinion . . . .”); see, e.g., State v. Schaffer, 270 P. 604 (Kan. 1928); Davis v. Walton, 276 P. 921
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by . . . the case of Buck v. Bell . . . is a complete answer” to any claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment.20
Today we know that the Commonwealth of Virginia sterilized Carrie
Buck on false premises.21 Buck’s child was not imbecilic, even under the
technical standards of the day (and “imbecile” along with “moron” and
“idiot” were technical terms used by sociologists, psychologists, zoologists,
and even geneticists of the day).22 It is often said that Carrie was sent to the
asylum because she was an unwed mother or a “bad girl.” The truth is that
Carrie was sent to the asylum because she was raped by a relative and the
family wanted to cover up the truth.23 But Carrie Buck’s case should not be
dismissed simply because it was a sad tale, or because the Court relied upon
factual errors, or because Chief Justice Taft and Justice Holmes sympathized
with eugenic thought.24 The decision’s effects were really far more
significant than a single hour-long operation, or the Justices’ personal views.
By 1933 over 150 million people in the United States lived in states with
eugenic laws, or so California’s Human Betterment Foundation, one of the
country’s most active eugenic organizations, declared.25 “[T]wenty-seven of
the forty-eight states had sterilization laws.”26 California was the leader in
such eugenic efforts, eventually sterilizing as many as 20,000 people.27
As Alexis de Tocqueville once claimed, Americans are given to taking
all socio-politico controversies and turning them into legal questions.28 In
the nineteenth century, Darwin’s cousin, the British Francis Galton, founded
modern eugenics (as well as the science of statistics, including regression to
the mean).29 But it was in America, not Britain, where eugenics had its great
legislative victories. The eugenics movement in America inspired not only
sterilization laws, but also anti-miscegenation laws and draconian
immigration reforms. Harry Laughlin, the most prominent advocate for

(Utah 1929); State v. Troutman, 299 P. 668 (Idado 1931); In re Main, 19 P.2d 153 (Okla. 1933); In
re Clayton, 234 N.W. 630 (Neb. 1931); Garcia v. State, 97 P.2d 264 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
20. Davis, 276 P. at 923.
21. See NOURSE, supra note 7, at 24.
22. See id. at 25. “Idiots” signified those with “a mental age of one or two, imbeciles between
three and seven, and morons between eight and twelve.” Id.
23. Id. at 24. This discovery is owed to the work of Professor Paul Lombardo. See generally
PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
BUCK V. BELL (2008).
24. LOMBARDO, supra note 23, at 158, 165–66 (discussing Taft and Holmes).
25. NOURSE, supra note 7, at 123 (quoting E.S. Gosney, Eugenics in California, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1934, at E5).
26. Id. at 20.
27. See LOMBARDO, supra note 23, at 241–42.
28. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., HarperCollins Publishers 2000) (1835, 1840) (“There is hardly a political question
in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.”).
29. See NOURSE, supra note 7, at 22; see also Francis Galton, Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope
and Aims, 10 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1904); Francis Galton, Studies in Eugenics, 11 AM. J. SOC. 11 (1905).
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sterilization legislation, was also the prime scientific advisor pushing the
infamous eugenically-based 1924 immigration laws.30 The impact of
eugenics should not be associated only with sterilization; coupled with the
false intelligence testing of the day, eugenic social thinking led to social
disparagement, deportation, and even life imprisonment in asylums for a
class of people that may well have been falsely branded as idiots, imbeciles,
and morons.
If there is a villain here, it was more than a perverted genetics. The
genetics born in a lab in the basement of Columbia University at the turn of
the twentieth century was genius.31 But genetics was and is a statistical
science, and any statistical science is one of correlation, not causation. As
such, in its early stages, it was extraordinarily capable of amplifying false
social assumptions; as The New York Times explained in 1936, a good deal
of eugenics was nothing more than “statistical gossip.”32 Unfortunately,
with these statistics, more was at stake than the cliché about stock markets
and hem lines. Sterilization may have only been an operation, but the
American eugenic movement was a set of social beliefs ranking persons as
naturally fit and unfit. These social beliefs, once married with the science of
eugenics, took on an aura of inevitability based less on science than on
social prejudice. It is often thought that eugenics was only about the
developmentally disabled, but in fact, popular intellectuals of the day,
progressive and conservative alike, embraced what we would today call a
eugenic theory of inherited and inevitable social caste, with the “fit” on top
and the “unfit” on the bottom—what eugenicists deemed a “native American
aristocracy.”33
As Madison Grant, one of the most widely read eugenicists of the
period, proclaimed: “A rigid system of selection through the elimination of
those who are weak or unfit—in other words, social failures—would solve
the whole question . . . .”34 This solution “can be applied to an ever
widening circle of social discards, beginning always with the criminal, the
diseased and the insane and extending gradually to types which may be
called weaklings rather than defectives and perhaps ultimately to worthless
race types.”35 As even eugenicists were ready to admit, the term “feeblemindedness” was a “lumber room” including everything from the inability to

30.
31.
32.
33.

KEVLES, supra note 15, at 103. See also LOMBARDO, supra note 23, at 78, 200.
See KEVLES, supra note 15, at 44.
See Editorial, Against Sterilization, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1936, at E8.
See MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE: OR THE RACIAL BASIS OF
EUROPEAN HISTORY 5 (4th ed. 1921).
34. Id. at 50–51.
35. Id. at 51.
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“appreciate moral ideals,” to the inability to control their passions, to defects
such as being blind or hearing-impaired, or simply to judgments,36 like the
one made about the raped Carrie Buck—that it was she who was “incapable
of ‘self-support and restraint.’”37
Who were the “unfit”? In some cases they were unfit because of
claimed mental defects, in others because of claimed immorality, and in still
others because of nationality (what was often termed “race” then). When the
psychologist Henry Goddard administered intelligence tests to immigrants at
Ellis Island, he found “40 percent” were feebleminded.38 The most famous
“bad breeding” stories were constructed around poor families, like the Jukes,
the Kallikaks, the Dugdales, the Mongrel Virginians, the Zeroes, the Hill
Folk, and my personal favorite, the Bunglers.39 These largely invented tales
of licentiousness and inherited feeblemindedness wore a thin veneer of
social science, securing them popular and academic respectability.40 Poverty
never perfectly tracked the category “unfit,” which could include everyone
from the hillbilly to the heiress. Just take a look at one of Life Magazine’s
most famous persons of 1936: Ann Hewitt, an heiress who was deemed
“feebleminded” by her mother, and sterilized under cover of appendectomy
so that the daughter, being barren, could not inherit the fortune her mother
coveted.41
Lest this seem extreme, I invite you to take the test given to one million
men in the Army after World War I to assess their intelligence and whose
results led many to declare “that the average intelligence of American army
recruits was not much more than a moron, hovering around the fourteenyear-old level.”42 Based on this test, respectable people, many scientists
among them, came to believe the seemingly impossible claim that “nearly
half of the white draft (47.3 percent)” was “feebleminded.”43 In 1936, the

36. HEREDITY AND EUGENICS 280–81 (William E. Castle et al. eds., 1912).
37. LOMBARDO, supra note 23, at 134 (quoting material from the official Briefs and Records of
Buck v. Bell submitted to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals).
38. Id. at 184 n.26; see also HENRY HERBERT GODDARD, FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS: ITS CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES 571–72 (1914).
39. See NOURSE, supra note 7, at 81.
40. See id.
41. As I have explained elsewhere:
In 1936, Ann Cooper Hewitt, heiress to the multimillion-dollar Cooper Hewitt fortune,
filed a civil suit charging that her mother had had her sterilized under cover of
appendectomy in order to steal Ann’s inheritance (if Ann had no children, the money
would go to the mother). . . . Day-by-day developments in the Hewitt case were reported
from coast to coast throughout 1936. The question was whether Ann was feebleminded;
to prove that, her mother emphasized Ann’s improper erotic infatuations with people
below her station.
Id. at 122. One of the infatuations was with an African-American porter. See id. at 209 n.5.
42. Id. at 25.
43. Id. (quoting DIANE B. PAUL, CONTROLLING HUMAN HEREDITY: 1865 TO THE PRESENT 67
(1998)).
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judge presiding over the Hewitt case took a test similar to the one given to
Ann and scored at the twelve-year-old level—a judicial moron.44
Here are some of the questions on the test:
The Knight engine is used in the Packard, Lozier, Stearns, or Pierce
Arrow? The Wyandotte is a kind of horse, fowl, cattle, or granite?
Isaac Pitman was most famous in physics, shorthand, railroading,
or electricity? Bud Fisher is famous as an actor, author, baseball
player, or comic artist? Salsify is a kind of snake, fish, lizard, or
vegetable? Rosa Bonheur is famous as a poet, painter, composer, or
sculptor? Cheviot is the name of a fabric, drink, dance, or food?45
III. THE LOST HISTORY OF RIGHT AND EQUALITY: BUCK’S CONSTITUTIONAL
TRAGEDY
Buck v. Bell is not taught today in constitutional law courses in part
because it is seen as a case about a false science. But it is also not taught
because it cannot be understood without appreciating what I will call a “lost
world” of constitutional thought. Carrie Buck’s case was not argued as one
of right in any modern sense of the term, nor for that matter were any of the
cases that were fought against sterilization during this period. Nor was Buck
v. Bell argued as a matter of so-called “substantive due process”—for, as G.
Edward White has written, no one really used that term at the time.46 Rights
were not the primary basis on which state courts had struck down
sterilization laws. Occasionally, state courts had held that sterilization was
cruel and unusual punishment,47 that the State had violated procedural due
process,48 or even that the legislature had done something that could be
analogized to a bill of attainder;49 but mostly state courts used an
argument—“class legislation”—that we have lost.50

44. Id. at 122–23.
45. Id. at 25 (citing MEMOIRS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES: PSYCHOLOGICAL
EXAMINING IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY (Robert M. Yerkes ed., 1921). “The answers are Knight
Engine: Stearns; Wyandotte: fowl; Pitman: shorthand; Bud Fisher: comic artist; salsify: vegetable;
Rosa Bonheur: painter; Cheviot: fabric.” Id.
46. See G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes’s Lochner Dissent,
63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 108 (1997).
47. E.g., Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 691 (D. Nev. 1918); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 417
(S.D. Iowa 1914), rev’d, Berry v. Davis, 242 U.S. 468 (1917).
48. E.g., Davis, 216 F. at 419 (Smith, J., concurring); Williams v. Smith, 131 N.E. 2, 2 (Ind.
1921).
49. E.g., Davis, 216 F. at 419.
50. Class legislation is known by some academics as a substitute for substantive due process, a
claim made by the political scientist Howard Gillman. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
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It is said that Chief Justice Taft told Holmes, when writing the Buck
opinion, to tone down his enthusiasm for eugenics and to emphasize the
facts.51 There is much more than meets the eye in Holmes’s seemingly
factual description. Holmes begins by telling us that Carrie Buck is a
“feeble-minded white woman.”52 Why mention her race or color? Holmes
never seemed to care very much about claims of race.53 The reference might
have been benign: the “white race” was a term of art at the time, and
appeared in various Supreme Court cases involving immigration and other
matters, along with other racial terms that have long since disappeared, such
as the Italian race and the Jewish race.54 Race-as-everything-fromnationality-to-religion was deeply embedded in eugenics; eugenicists wrote
the major immigration laws of the 1920s because they aimed to limit the
invasion of the “unfit” races (what we would call nationalities today), such
as Southern and Eastern Europeans.55
Of course, this was a day and age in which race was a hopelessly
ambiguous term conflating everything from nationality to religion. (As the
University of Wisconsin’s most famous sociologist and eugenicist, Professor
E.A. Ross, wrote in 1914, the Jews had a penchant for “cross-racial
‘perversion.’”56) By noting that Carrie Buck was white, Holmes may have
wanted to avoid any confusion with other racial categories. He may have
known that other state courts had already announced the connection between
eugenics and race, pronouncing it dangerous. The New Jersey Supreme
Court explained that legislatures might find other groups, not simply the
feebleminded, less than desirable citizens, that such judgments might be
“based on ‘[r]acial differences,’ and that this risk was greatest in
communities (presumably the South) where the racial ‘question is
unfortunately a permanent and paramount issue.’”57 Even Carrie Buck’s

BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
However, Gillman confused due process and equal protection. Many have also confused “class
legislation” with a fear for factional legislation held by some Justices; although there is some
evidence of this, it cannot explain the cases in which class legislation arguments were in fact
successful—ones which typically had a stronger equal protection component. In a lengthy review of
the vast number of equal protection cases during this period, I show this, and I explain that “class
legislation” far exceeded the notion of classification; it was aimed at preventing forms of aristocracy,
petty and large. See generally V.F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The Lost History of Governance
and Equal Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955 (2009).
51. LOMBARDO, supra note 23, at 166.
52. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
53. See Brad Snyder, The House That Built Holmes, LAW & HIST. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
See also infra text accompanying notes 108–13.
54. See NOURSE, supra note 7, at 35, 188 n.55.
55. David Bernstein & Thomas C. Leonard, Excluding Unfit Workers: Social Control Versus
Social Justice in the Age of Economic Reform, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at 177,
183–84.
56. NOURSE, supra note 7, at 60.
57. Id. at 29 (quoting Smith v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963, 966 (N.J. 1913)).
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counsel had argued that “new ‘classes’ and even ‘races’ might be added to
the scope” of Virginia’s law.58
As we read on in Buck v. Bell, it appears that Holmes is taking Taft’s
advice about the facts, and this is no doubt how the case is read today. Only
one extremely well-trained in the lost constitutional doctrine of the day will
see any law at all in his recitation of fact. However, an astute student will
recognize that Holmes’s facts assume the single most important
constitutional rule of the day—one about power, not right. As a general
matter, in the period from 1890 until 1940, the vast majority of
constitutional cases, even the cases we today call ones of substantive due
process, were ones then called “the police power.”59 The general, but highly
counterintuitive, rule was quite simple: even if rights were at issue (property
rights, contract rights, speech rights), if the State created the rule in the
exercise of the police power, then the right was trumped—due process had
been satisfied, substantively so.60 Let me say this again, as it is directly
contrary to the standard view of the era: the Lochner era was not a period of
strong property rights as some conservatives have argued, and certainly was
not a period of laissez-faire, as liberals have argued.61 Property rights, like
contract rights or speech rights, could be trumped by the police power
(hence cedar trees could be cut down to prevent tree rot, rent control could
be imposed during WWI, and Mrs. Whitney could be sent to jail if her
speech caused harm).62 In Buck, Holmes assumes this rule without ever
stating it because he detested the police power terminology, which he
derided as “apologetic phrases” for constitutional analysis.63
Language which today seems to us gratuitous cruelty—“[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough”64—was in fact necessary to apply the
governing legal doctrine, even as it hides that law from view. One of the
central premises of the police power rule was that if the government
believed that your rights were interfering with or harming others, it had the

58. Id.
59. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due
Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 752–53 (2009).
60. See id. at 753.
61. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 34 (2003); see also
Nourse, supra note 59, at 789.
62. Nourse, supra note 59, at 752. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (regarding cedar
trees); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (regarding rent control); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927) (regarding harmful speech).
63. Tyson & Brother—United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (describing the police power as an apology for legal analysis).
64. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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police power to regulate.65 However much we may find the notion of harm
ambiguous today, at the time it tended to govern constitutional analyses
ranging far and wide (think “clear and present danger”66). And so, Holmes
should not be read as simply stating the facts, but as engaging in
heresthetics67: structuring the argument so that there was only one answer.
Hence, we read: defective persons, if “discharged would become a menace”
transmitting insanity and other defects like any other disease.68
Having answered the major doctrinal question (albeit neither citing nor
answering any conflicting law), Holmes moves on to insist that procedural
due process had not been violated.69 Chief Justice Taft, who had cooled to
his own eugenic ties at the time,70 cautioned Holmes on this as well: Holmes
is thus careful to emphasize the Virginia law’s procedural protections. He
tells us that sterilization is done “under careful safeguard,” and “on
complying with the very careful provisions by which the act protects the
patients from possible abuse.”71 Today, of course, we know that Holmes’s
claims misstate the truth. He asserts that the operations are performed
“without serious pain or substantial danger to life.”72 In fact, we know that
the operation for women was quite a bit more dangerous and that some
women did in fact die from the procedure.73 We also know that the
procedural due process to which Carrie Buck was entitled was largely
illusory. The suit that brought Buck to the Court was constructed precisely
because sterilization laws had become a dead letter due to hostile state court

65. The bar’s professional materials reflected similar views well into the 1930s. See 11 AM.
JUR. Constitutional Law § 267 (1937) (“[I]t is settled that the possession and enjoyment of all rights
are subject to the police power . . . . Consequently, both persons and property are subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, welfare, and prosperity
of the people of the state.”) (footnote omitted); id. § 268 (“No rule in constitutional law is better
settled than the principle that all property is held subject to the right of the state reasonably to
regulate its use under the police power . . . .”); id. § 264 (“Rights and privileges arising from
contracts are subject to regulations for the protection of the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety, in the same sense and to the same extent as is all property . . . .”); see also HUGH
EVANDER WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 643 (1936) (“The great powers of
government . . . are the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation.
Whenever there is a proper exercise of these powers, personal liberty is rightly delimited. . . .
Property for long years made a direct appeal to due process, but its direct appeal for the most part
failed.”); id. at 707 (“[I]f the social control is a proper exercise of the police power . . . there is no
violation of due process as a matter of substance.”).
66. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
67. This is William Riker’s term. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION
ix (1986).
68. Buck, 274 U.S. at 206.
69. Id. at 207.
70. LOMBARDO, supra note 23, at 166 (describing Taft’s cautions to Holmes).
71. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205–06.
72. Id. at 205.
73. KEVLES, supra note 15, at 169 (noting that the Germans estimated that, during this period,
one to two percent of women undergoing the operation died).
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constitutional rulings.74 Carrie’s lawyer was affiliated with the very hospital
she was suing.75 The “due process” with which she was provided involved a
woman who, as Professor Paul Lombardo found, concluded that the “look”
of Buck’s seven month old child, Vivian, proved her imbecilic.76 Then, too,
the major evidence against Buck was constructed by Harry Laughlin, the
author of sterilization laws throughout the country.77 This hardly reflects the
disinterested scrupulosity that Holmes represented.
All this simply cleared the underbrush for Holmes’s major claim: “The
attack is not upon the procedure but upon the substantive law.”78 Holmes
was a great opponent of what we today call substantive due process.79 He
had no taste for substantive due process because he had no taste for rights or
equality.80 Even in cases where he embraced rights, he rejected the doctrinal
parlance of the day, whether in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon81 on property
rights or in his dissents in price-fixing and First Amendment cases.82 Justice
Holmes was a balancer through and through.83
In fact, Holmes was so contemptuous of rights, the term appears
nowhere in his Buck opinion. Without a reference to counsel’s argument,
one would never know that Carrie Buck’s lawyer had in fact gestured toward
a right of “bodily integrity.”84 Holmes managed to dismiss the claim
without even using the term “right,” stating that “[i]t seems to be contended
that in no circumstances could such an order be justified.”85 Holmes knew
that absolute “right” was not the doctrine of the day, this was simply a rather
disingenuous way of backhanding Carrie Buck’s claim. Even in the average
case of property rights, contract rights, or free speech rights, the State’s
interest in public health or safety (the police power) could trump a claim of

74. NOURSE, supra note 7, at 27–28.
75. Id. at 27.
76. Id.
77. See LOMBARDO, supra note 23, at 108–09, 133–35.
78. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (emphasis added).
79. See Nourse, supra note 59, at 773 n.120.
80. See id.
81. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
82. See Tyson & Brother—United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445
(1927) (“[W]hen Legislatures are held to be authorized to do anything considerably affecting public
welfare it is covered by apologetic phrases like the police power.”) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Tyson
& Brother—United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc., written by Justice Sutherland, was a typical
“substantive due process” case in the sense that it struck down a pricefixing or labor law.
83. See William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of
Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 820 (1998).
84. See NOURSE, supra note 7, at 27.
85. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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right.86 In short, there was no point to Holmes’s contempt for Carrie’s claim
of right; she still would have lost under the police power (health would have
trumped her rights claim under the conventional doctrine of the day). The
only point of this sentence, then, was to make a pragmatist’s philosophical
claim: that, in life and the law, there are no absolutes, including absolute
rights.87 For philosophical pragmatists, rights are conclusions, not givens.
One wonders, however, in such a case where another’s liberty was at stake,
whether such a philosopher’s errand can only be described as deeply
arrogant, particularly for a Justice who claimed that his greatest opinions
emanated from the principle that he was “not God.”88
Today, moderns wonder why Holmes’s opinion elicited support across
the Court: progressives, moderates, and conservatives signed on to Holmes’s
Buck v. Bell opinion. The great progressive, Brandeis, was noticeably
silent.89 He would go on to cite the Buck opinion as an example of properly
allowing the states to meet “modern conditions by regulations which ‘a
century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected
as arbitrary and oppressive’”—in one of his most iconic dissents, Olmstead
v. United States.90 Chief Justice Taft and Justice Stone may well have
followed the doctrine of the day: public right could trump individual right.91
There was a health reason for the law, just as there was for vaccination, the
principal and only precedent upon which Holmes relied.92
But what of the so-called libertarians—Justice McReynolds and others
who would become known as the “four horsemen” and who are often touted
as great defenders of right? McReynolds was the author of Meyer93 and
Pierce,94 cases often cited for a standard list of “reserved rights” including

86. See Nourse, supra note 59, at 771–72.
87. LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 222 (2001)
(describing the pragmatist philosopher Charles Peirce’s questioning of absolutes); id. at 63
(describing Holmes’s questioning of absolute truth).
88. David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449,
487 n.132 (1994) (quoting a letter from Justice Holmes to Lewis Einstein).
89. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 619 (2009) (describing Justice
Brandeis’s thoughts on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
90. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 62–64.
92. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding the far less serious invasion of
liberty accompanying vaccination).
93. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating on substantive due process grounds a
Nebraska law prohibiting foreign language instruction in both public and private schools, with
Justices Van Devanter and Butler joining Justice McReynolds’s opinion).
94. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(invalidating an Oregon statute requiring all children to attend public school, with Justices Van
Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler joining Justice McReynolds’s opinion).
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freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.95
Some academics have suggested that Justice McReynolds (who
famously refused to say hello to Brandeis because he was a Jew) was one of
the Supreme Court’s true rights libertarians.96 But, if that were the case, he,
along with Justices Sutherland, Van Devanter, and Sanford, should have
dissented in Buck, but did not. Why? Because outside the areas of labor and
property rights and occasional forays such as Meyer and Pierce, the
libertarians followed the standard doctrine of the day—rights were subject to
the police power. In Buck, only Pierce Butler dissented without opinion,97 a
decision that many speculate was influenced by his Catholicism and
Catholics’ distaste for sterilization as bodily mutilation.
Today, of course, rights have become something else; they have taken
on an absolutist aura as conventional as it is untrue (even strict scrutiny is
not in fact fatal). I have spent a good deal of time arguing that rights during
the first three decades of the twentieth century once had an entirely nonDworkinian logic98 and I will not belabor the point here; I make it simply to
emphasize the foreignness of the constitutional law of 1927. For example, at
the time, students of the doctrine of the era, including Professor Robert
Cushman, praised Holmes’s “three generation of imbeciles” as a “trenchant”
explanation for why the law was a “reasonable social protection, entirely
compatible with due process of law.”99 However extreme Holmes’s opinion
seems today, it appeared reasonable not simply for progressives, who
praised it (precisely because it refused to engage in what we call
“substantive due process”), but also for conservatives and libertarians.
Oxymoronic as it may sound, Buck v. Bell’s implied police power analysis
was banal as a doctrinal matter, even if today it appears lawlessly unbounded
to constitutional text or structure (the “police power” after all appears

95. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
96. See Bernstein, supra note 61, at 44–45 (characterizing McReynolds’s opinions in Pierce and
Meyer as libertarian).
97. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1926) (Butler, J., dissenting).
98. See generally Nourse, supra note 59.
99. Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1926–27, 22 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 70, 92 (1928).
Special thanks to David Bernstein for bringing this to my attention.
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nowhere in the Constitution). The state courts had not rejected sterilization
claims based on substantive due process or rights; rights were too weak
against the State’s asserted health rationale.
However banal in 1927, Buck v. Bell cannot be read without a shudder
today in 2011 for the extraordinary breadth of state power it asserts. In its
most famous passage, Holmes writes:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not
call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in
order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.100
Taken seriously of course, this passage justifies extraordinary state power—
the power to do almost anything to citizens short of killing them (and
perhaps even that, at least in case of war).101 Progressives, at the time, found
no problem with this logic, but nor did the Justices who today are considered
libertarians.102 And that is because they not only shared a notion of right as
far weaker than we imagine today, one that cannot be justified in my opinion
by the constitutional text or the history of the Bill of Rights or even based on
the Founders’ ideals, but one quite prevalent in the first three decades of the
twentieth century.
So, too, the notion of “social harm” supporting the police power was
completely untethered from constitutional text and ripe for misuse in the
hands of a Justice such as Holmes, who believed that the Constitution could
be reduced to ad hoc balancing. Eugenics was built upon the notion of
harm; indeed, it thrived on a sense of imminent doom: that society was
degenerating because of what were called its “weaklings” and “discards.”
The idea that society was being swamped by incompetents was a common
trope for eugenicists: the unfit were a “menace.”103 Eugenicists were not
afraid of talking of death: as Herbert Spencer had written, “[i]f they are not

100. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (citation omitted).
101. Holmes, famously proud of his Civil War wounds, was of course referring to his service in
that war when he said that the State “may call upon the best citizens for their lives.” Id.
102. Ironically, given Holmes’s insistence that the police power was a silly doctrine, he relied
upon harm in his own “balancing” approach.
103. See id. at 205–06.
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sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best that they should die.”104
Even Teddy Roosevelt warned of “race death.”105 Given such apocalyptic
fears of widespread and imminent death, it is not surprising that lesser
intrusions on an individual were considered necessary and even kind, a
“practical, merciful and inevitable solution.”106 Like the great popular
eugenicists of the day, Holmes wrote in Buck that eugenics would prevent
society from being “swamped” by incompetents, that fewer criminals would
be executed, and that fewer imbeciles would starve.107 Given such draconian
results on one side of Holmes’s balance, of course the “lesser” sacrifice (a
small operation on an individual) would seem fully appropriate. (Ironically,
Holmes’s then entirely idiosyncratic balancing rhetoric often yielded results
similar to the police power analysis.)
We come, then, to the final paragraph and real secret of Buck v. Bell,
which dismisses Carrie Buck’s equal protection claim.108 Here surfaces the
ultimate constitutional tragedy of the opinion. As I explained earlier,
sterilization laws were largely dead letters by 1927 when Holmes decided
the case, which is why Buck v. Bell was so important in reviving and
legitimating eugenics in the early 1930s. Equal protection was the most
common rationale used by state courts to strike down sterilization laws, but
Holmes backhanded this argument in a final flourish, dismissing it as the
“last resort” of the constitutional lawyer.109 There is a reason that state
courts used a form of equal protection to strike down sterilization laws, but
again, most of the history of this has been lost, as it took the form of a
doctrine known as “class legislation.”110 For progressives, equal protection
had a bad odor for its role in thwarting organized labor, when substantive
due process failed (in its most infamous instantiation upholding the labor
injunction in Truax v. Corrigan).111 But this ignored the history of class
legislation going back to the 1880s and 1890s, a history about caste and
legislative due process.112 After all, at a minimum, the Equal Protection
Clause must mean that, in America, state legislatures have no power to

104. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 415 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1873) (1850).
105. See Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President, State of the Union Address (Dec. 3, 1906), in
STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 181 (Echo Library 2007) (declaring
“race death” as the penalty for “wilful sterility”).
106. GRANT, supra note 33, at 51.
107. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
108. See id. at 208.
109. Id.
110. Nourse & Maguire, supra note 50, at 119.
111. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
112. See generally Nourse & Maguire, supra note 50.
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legislate castes, to create or establish a “born” aristocracy. Our entire
constitutional history demonstrates the continuing importance of this
principle, first announced in the Declaration of Independence, that “all men
are created equal.”113 This is not in fact because they are equal, but because,
in a democracy, they must be presumed equal citizens. Set against these
basic principles, the eugenicists’ natural American aristocracy cannot stand.
Class legislation, although successful only sparingly, had an original
meaning barring caste.114 It was supported by constitutional text: the
Fourteenth Amendment, not to mention the anti-nobility clauses. It was
supported by constitutional principle and history: America fought a war
against Britain to replace aristocracy with a democracy in which no one was
“born” to rule over others. Holmes’s view of equal protection, that it was a
matter of logical classification (in which case it was a non-rule, since all
legislation classifies), had no room for the idea of social caste. No doubt he
believed, like many others, that class legislation had been interred with cases
like Lochner, which shifted the claim against labor away from class
legislation and toward right.115 Holmes would win the future on this view,
and most scholars and students would never know of a different, albeit
fleeting history of class legislation. In the process, we would lose a notion
of equality predating the Fourteenth Amendment and reaching to the
Founding: that in America, there are no blood castes. Ultimately, traces of
this view would have to be resurrected to limit Buck, but only fifteen years
later, after Holmes was gone and “the Nazis’ insistent portrayals of
America . . . as unfit and full of weaker white ‘races’ transformed the
public’s understanding”116 of eugenics. Hitler made clear how dangerous
blood government could be. As the Supreme Court wrote in 1942 when
America was at war: “The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle,
far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause
races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear.”117 Ironically, it was Felix Frankfurter, Holmes’s great acolyte,
who insisted on the equal protection rationale in Skinner v. Oklahoma,
striking down Oklahoma’s sterilization law. Frankfurter recognized what
Holmes could not, that equality was the least aggressive and the most
persuasive constitutional principle at stake in allowing legislatures the power
to create an aristocracy of birth.

113. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
114. See Nourse & Maguire, supra note 50; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884).
115. See generally Nourse, supra note 59.
116. NOURSE, supra note 7, at 15.
117. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). For Frankfurter’s role, see NOURSE, supra
note 7, at 144–45.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Constitutional tragedies need not be denounced on the day of their
decision. Indeed, if one were to theorize tragedy, one would have to
recognize that true tragedies are janus-faced, they are tragic precisely
because once banal, they become over time, not merely wrong, but evil.
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